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Islamic law, customary law and Afghan informal justice
In: Special report 363
Zero waste engineering
"Explores new scientific principles on which sustainability and zero-waste engineering can be based Presents new models for energy efficiency, cooling processes, and natural chemical and material selection in industrial applications and business - Explains how "green buildings" and "green homes" can be efficiently built and operated with zero waste - Offers case histories and successful experiments in sustainability and zero-waste engineering"--
Untying the Afghan knot: negotiating Soviet withdrawal
In: An Institute for the Study of Diplomacy book
World Affairs Online
A case for the abolition of "terrorism" and its industry
In: Critical studies on terrorism, S. 1-24
ISSN: 1753-9161
The Coloniality of the Religious Terrorism Thesis – CORRIGENDUM
In: Review of international studies: RIS, S. 1-1
ISSN: 1469-9044
Employment Trends and Relative Influence of U.S. Retail Subsector Employments on GDP
In: Archives of Business Research – Vol. 11, No. 7, 2023
SSRN
Influence of Residential Internet Access and Patented Innovation on U.S. Non-store Retail Industries' Employment
In: Khan, A. (2023). Influence of Residential Internet Access and Patented Innovation on U.S. Non-store Retail Industries' Employment, Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 10(80):107-124
SSRN
Race, coloniality and the post 9/11 counter-discourse: Critical Terrorism Studies and the reproduction of the Islam-Terrorism discourse
In: Critical studies on terrorism, Band 14, Heft 4, S. 498-501
ISSN: 1753-9161
The End of Antitrust History Revisited
This Review engages Tim Wu's book, The Curse of Bigness, to explain the significance of the current rupture in antitrust and to situate it within a broader intellectual trajectory. Debates over the foundational purpose of antitrust are not new, and examining how this latest clash fits alongside previous contestations is essential for understanding what has yielded the current contestability and assessing the competing visions. Part I of this Review summarizes Wu's chief contributions in his recent work, focusing on three tenets that form the basis of the book. Part II offers an analytic breakdown of the overhaul in antitrust doctrine that is the subject of Wu's critique, tracing the transformation of antitrust to changes in descriptive claims and normative assumptions that the Chicago School introduced. I argue that framing Chicago's interventions this way lets us map the current antitrust debate with greater coherence. Doing so, moreover, reveals the limits of proffered correctives to the Chicago School and underscores the need for what has been called a "Neo-Brandeisian" program in law and political economy. Part III argues that a central component of the Neo-Brandeisian project should include reforming the institutional structure of antitrust law and policy. Although most critiques of present-day antitrust focus on doctrinal rules and the substantive legal framework that governs antitrust analysis, the exclusive reliance on a common law approach to antitrust is a key source and enabler of current dysfunctions. Complementing this common law structure with an administrative approach and adopting clear rules that curb judicial discretion would help democratize antitrust in the ways that Wu and other reformers champion.
BASE
Religion and international security Religion and international security , by Lee Marsden, Cambridge/Medford, Polity Press, 2019, 270 pp., £50.00(hardback), ISBN 9780745663630
In: Critical studies on terrorism, Band 12, Heft 4, S. 755-757
ISSN: 1753-9161
The Separation of Platforms and Commerce
A handful of digital platforms mediate a growing share of online commerce and communications. By structuring access to markets, these firms function as gatekeepers for billions of dollars in economic activity. One feature dominant digital platforms share is that they have integrated across business lines such that they both operate a platform and market their own goods and services on it. This structure places dominant platforms in direct competition with some of the businesses that depend on them, creating a conflict of interest that platforms can exploit to further entrench their dominance, thwart competition, and stifle innovation. This Article argues that the potential hazards of integration by dominant tech platforms invite recovering structural separations. Separations regimes limit the lines of business in which a firm can engage, either by proscribing entry in certain markets or by requiring that distinct lines of business be operated through separate affiliates. Previously implemented both as a standard regulatory intervention and key antitrust remedy in network industries, structural separations have been largely abandoned. At the same time that lawmakers have weakened or eliminated sector-specific regulatory regimes, judicial interpretation of antitrust law has drastically narrowed the forms of vertical conduct and structures that register as anticompetitive. And when antitrust enforcers have targeted these forms of conduct and structures, they have applied remedies that generally (1) fail to target the underlying source of the problem and (2) overwhelm the institutional capacities of the actors assigned to oversee them. Neglecting structural remedies results in both substantive harms and institutional misalignments – effects that are especially pronounced in digital platform markets. This Article seeks to give structural separations a seat back at the table. Tracing the history of separations reveals that they have been motivated by a host of functional goals, ranging from fair competition and system resiliency to media diversity and administrability. Recalling this broader set of concerns brings into focus the range of factors at stake when dealing with dominant intermediaries and invites consideration of the degree to which separations in platform markets would also respond to a diverse set of problems.
BASE
The Ideological Roots of America's Market Power Problem
Mounting research shows that America has a market power problem. In sectors ranging from airlines and poultry to eyeglasses and semiconductors, just a handful of companies dominate. The decline in competition is so consistent across markets that excessive concentration and undue market power now look to be not an isolated issue but rather a systemic feature of America's political economy. This is troubling because monopolies and oligopolies produce a host of harms. They depress wages and salaries, raise consumer costs, block entrepreneurship, stunt investment, retard innovation, and render supply chains and complex systems highly fragile. Dominant firms' economic power allows them, in turn, to concentrate political power, which they then use to win favorable policies and further entrench their dominance. As a few technology platform companies mediate a rapidly growing share of our commerce and communications, the problem will only worsen. Since these gatekeeper firms have captured control over key distribution networks, they can squeeze the businesses reliant on their channels. Furthermore, these firms leverage their platform power into new lines of business, extending their dominance across sectors. Their muscle, in turn, spurs additional consolidation, as both competitors and producers bulk up in order to avoid getting squashed. Concentration begets concentration.
BASE